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Is Risk Sharing in the United States
A Regional Phenomenon?
By Bent E. Sorensen and Oved Yosha
R
egions within the United States routinely
experience economic fluctuations that
differ from those of other regions. For
example, in the past few years, falling wheat
prices have slowed growth in the value of total
output in Kansas. Such developments can pose
concerns for policymakers because macroeco-
nomictoolslikemonetarypolicyaffectallregions,
not just specific regions. Fortunately, several
mechanisms help insulate regional income and
consumption from region-specific output fluctua-
tions. Diversification of asset ownership across
regions, made possible by national capital mar-
kets, smoothes regional income and, in turn, con-
sumption. The federal tax system also helps
protect regional income and consumption from
region-specific changes in output. Finally, adjust-
ments to saving further insulate consumption
from variation in output. In effect, each of these
mechanisms mitigates the effect of region-
specific economic fluctuations by pooling risks
across regionsby providing risk sharing.
Although earlier research has documented the
pattern of risk sharing for the United States as a
whole, patterns may differ across broad regions
of the nation.
1 Eastern states, for example, may
benefit more from income smoothing through
capital markets due to their proximity to Wall
Street. Moreover, geographic distance may
affect whether and how risk is shared. For
instance, it may be easier for Kansas residents
to own property, such as a farm or hotel, in Col-
orado than in Massachusetts. Similarly, busi-
ness owners in Kansas are more likely to obtain
loans in Missouri than in New York. In this
case, geography may affect the ability of risk
sharing to mitigate region-specific fluctuations
in output. Because geography matters, this arti-
cle examines whether risk sharing occurs more
in some regions than in others and whether risk
sharing is greater within large regions of the
United States than between regions.
The first section of the article presents the
conceptual framework of risk sharing and devel-
ops a method for estimating the amount of risk
sharing provided by different mechanisms. The
second section reports estimates of risk sharing
patterns within and across a set of large U.S.
regions.Theseestimatesrevealsomeimportant
regional differences. Moreover, the estimates
indicate there is more overall risk sharing
within regions than between regions. The risk
sharing provided by capital markets and the
federaltaxsystemisessentiallythesamewithin
Bent E. Sorensen is a senior economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Oved Yosha is a senior lec-
turer at Tel Aviv University and a visiting scholar at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Steve Lamberty, a
research associate at the bank, helped prepare the article.
This article is on the banks web site at www.kc.frb.org.and across regions, implying that these are
nationwidemechanisms.Incontrast,risksharing
through saving adjustments is more local, occur-
ring just within regions.
I. RISK SHARING: CONCEPTS AND
MEASUREMENT
Risk sharing reduces the volatility of regional
incomeandconsumption.Suppose,forexample,
that risks are shared within a particular group of
states. The pooling of risks essentially makes the
income and consumption of an individual state
depend on the output of the group rather than
solely on the states own output. Because the total
output of a group is generally less variable than
thatofasinglestate,risksharinglowersthevola-
tility of state-level income and consumption.
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The potential for risk sharing appears to be
considerable.Chart1comparesgrowthinoutput
per capita for an illustrative group of states to
growth in the nations output per capita, using
gross state product (GSP) to measure state out-
put and gross domestic product (GDP) as the
measure of national output. As shown in the
chart,justasoutputisgenerallymorevolatilefor
asinglestatethanforagroupofstates,growthin
state output is generally more variable than
growth in the nations output. And, as expected,
smaller states or states heavily dependent on a
single industryMaine or Louisiana, for exam-
plehavemorevolatileGSPgrowththanlarger,




Three mechanisms allow regions, such as
states, to share region-specific risk. One mecha-
nism is capital market income smoothingsim-
ply referred to as income smoothing in this arti-
clewhich results from interstate ownership of
productive assets. Interstate ownership of assets
makes state-level income smoother than state
output, in the sense that a states income will be
partly insulated from fluctuations in its output.
By smoothing income, interstate ownership of
assets also helps insulate state-level consump-
tion spending from fluctuations in output.
For example, suppose farmers in Corn Belt
states hold much of their savings in investment
portfolios that are heavily invested in assets in
other states, such as California. Through their
savings portfolios, these Corn Belt residents
mayownconsiderableamountsofpropertyand
stock of firms in Silicon Valley. In a drought
year, crop output may drop severely, but the
incomeofCornBeltresidentswilltypicallyfall
less than output if part of their income comes
frominvestmentsinSiliconValley.Conversely,
in an exceptionally good crop year, the overall
income of Corn Belt states generally will rise
by less than the increase in their output.
Financialinstrumentssuchasstocks,options,
and futures, as well as standard insurance poli-
cies against natural disasters, facilitate this type
of smoothing. Well-functioning and accessible
capital markets are essential for diversification
of ownership and the income smoothing it pro-
vides. Of course, the individual who purchases
derivativesecurities,orinsurance,willnothave
state-level income smoothing in mind. But in
the case of a statewide economic downturn or
calamity (for example, flooding), the less vola-
tileincomeofindividualswillalsorenderstate-
level income less volatile (if large numbers of
individuals have purchased flood insurance).
Asecond mechanism that provides risk sharing
is federal disposable income smoothingor
simply disposable income smoothingwhich
results from the system of federal taxes and
transferpayments.Becausethefederaltaxcode
is progressive, residents of states that do well in
a given year make higher than average tax pay-
ments to the federal government. As a result,
disposable income rises relatively less than
income. Transfers, of which social security and
Medicare benefits are the largest by far, tend to
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Maine and U.S. Louisiana and U.S.
California and U.S. Florida and U.S.vary little with state output and therefore con-
tribute to reducing the volatility of disposable
income in a state.
4 Thus, taxes and transfers at
least partly insulate a states disposable income
from fluctuations in its income.
5 In turn, dispos-
able income smoothing helps reduce the volatil-
ity of state-level consumption.
The third mechanism for risk sharing is con-
sumption smoothing, which involves making
adjustmentstothesavingrateandtowealthport-
folios through borrowing and lending or buying
and selling assets. For example, when oil prices
fall, Oklahomans can save a smaller fraction of
their disposable income or sell real estate and
financial wealth to New Yorkers, allowing them
to reduce their consumption more moderately
despite their unusually low oil revenues. Okla-
homans may also borrow from other states,
directly or through financial institutions, to
smooththeirconsumption.Suchbehaviormakes
the states consumption less volatile than its dis-
posable income.
In principle, each of these three mechanisms
canproviderisksharing.Theirrelativeeffective-
ness, though, depends on the persistence of fluc-
tuations in state output. If state-specific booms
and recessions are short-lived, income smooth-
ing, disposable income smoothing, and con-
sumption smoothing are all viable (and virtually
equivalent). For example, income from a mutual
fund can help a worker smooth a drop in wages
caused by a temporary layoff. In this case, port-
foliodiversificationprovidesaformofinsurance
against income fluctuations. Even in the absence
ofmutualfundincome,theworkermightbeable
to smooth consumption by borrowing on a credit
card. As a result, in the face of temporary fluctu-
ations in state output, either diversification of
ownership portfolios or borrowing and lending
can smooth consumption spending in the state.
If changes in state output are long-lasting,
however, they cannot be smoothed through sav-
ing adjustments. Only income smoothing and
disposable income smoothing can insulate
income and consumption from long-lasting
changes in output. If a workers wage income
drops permanentlydue to physical disability,
forinstanceneitherchangesintherateofsav-
ing nor borrowing will allow the worker to
maintain the same standard of living. Only
alternative income sources such as mutual
funds or some other form of insurance can
allow the worker to maintain his previous level
of spending.
Measuring the risk sharing achieved through
the three mechanisms
The measurement of how much risk sharing
is achieved in practice is based on the concept
of full risk sharing. If income smoothing
through capital markets allows risks to be fully
shared among a group of states, generally
accepted economic theory indicates that the
income of every state is a fixed fraction of the
pooled income of the group.
6 This has several
important implications. First, because a states
incomeisdependentononlythepooledincome
of the group of states, the income of a state
depends on its output only to the extent that
changes in its output affect the groups income.




pooling the individual risks faced by states,
effectively making the average of those risks
equal zero. But risk sharing cannot mitigate
volatility due to groupwide risks because there
is no way to diversify away such risks.
The third implication of full risk sharing
throughincomesmoothingisthattheincomeof
all the states in the group will grow at the same
rateat the rate the pooled income grows.
Moreover, because income is fully insulated
from state-specific fluctuations in output, dis-
posable income and consumption are also fully
insulated from these fluctuations. As a result,
each states disposable income and consump-
36 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYtion will grow at the rates of disposable income
and consumption for the group. These growth
rate implications of full risk sharing are essential
for measuring the amount of risk sharing
achieved in practice.
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In the event full risk sharing is not achieved
through income smoothing, it may be achieved
in conjunction with disposable income smooth-
ing and consumption smoothing. For example,
the combined smoothing provided by capital
markets and federal taxes and transfers may be
necessary to achieve full risk sharing. Then the
growth rate of each states income would differ,
but each states disposable income would grow
atthesamerate. As longas some combinationof
mechanisms yields full risk sharing, the con-
sumption of all the states in the risk sharing
group will grow at the same rate.
Of course, risk sharing may not be full in prac-
tice.Butthepropertiesoffullrisksharingleadto
simple regressions that measure, for a given risk
sharing group, how much smoothing actually
takes place through each mechanism. These
regressions are estimated using data over time
and across states on output, income, disposable
income, and consumption.
9
The regressions estimated for a given risk
sharing group measure the average fraction of
state-specific output fluctuations absorbed by
each risk sharing mechanism. State-specific out-
put fluctuations are defined as fluctuations in
state output per capita minus fluctuations in the
groupspooledoutputpercapita.Moreprecisely,
state-specific output growth (of state i in year t)
is measured as DD gsp gsp it t - , where Dgspit
denotes the growth rate of state is GSP per




put of the group. Therefore, to measure the
amount of risk that is shared among states,
aggregate output fluctuations must be removed
from the state-level fluctuations to isolate
smoothable output fluctuations.
In addition to state-specific growth rates of
GSP, the regressions use state-specific growth
rates of state income, state disposable income,
and state consumption, all in per capita terms.
State-specific income growth, DD si si it t - , is
the growth rate of income per capita in state i
relative to the growth rate of income per capita
for the entire risk sharing group. The state-spe-
cific growth rates of disposable income and of
consumption are defined in the same way and
are denoted DD dsi dsi it t - and DD cc it t -
respectively.
Measuringincomesmoothing.Anestimateof
the amount of income smoothing provided by
capital markets is obtained from the coefficient
bI in the following regression:
10
(D D D D gsp gsp si si it t it t -- - = )( )
ab e II i t t i t gsp gsp +- + () DD . (1)
To see why, suppose that income smoothing
yields full risk sharing, causing the income of
allthestatesintherisksharinggrouptogrowat
thesamerate.Thenstate-specificincomegrowth,
DD si si it t - , is always zero, and the variable on
the left side of equation (1) equals just state-
specific GSP growth. In this case, equation (1)
simplifies to a regression of state-specific GSP
growth on itself, and the coefficient bI equals
one. At the other extreme, if there is no income
smoothing, changes in state GSPlead to identi-
cal changes in state income. Then state-specific
income growth equals state-specific GSPgrowth,
making the variable on the left side of equation
(1) equal zero. In this case, equation (1) simpli-
fies to a regression of a variable that is always
zero on state-specific GSP growth, so the coef-
ficient bI equals zero. In general, bI will be
between zero and one, with more interstate
incomesmoothingyieldingalargercoefficient.
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increase in DD gsp gsp it t - , the variable on the
right side of regression equation (1). If capital
markets smooth an average of 40 percent of
state-specific fluctuations in GSP, 60 percent of
the increase in DD gsp gsp it t - will pass through
toincomegrowth.ThenDD si si it t - willincrease
0.6 percentage point. The difference between
state-specific GSP and income growth, the vari-
ableontheleftsideofequation(1),thenrises0.4
percentage point. In this case, bI , which mea-
sures the fraction of state-specific fluctuations in
GSPgrowthsmoothedoncapitalmarkets,equals
0.4.
Measuring disposable income smoothing.
Similarly, an estimate of the amount of dispos-
able income smoothing is obtained from the
coefficientbDI in the regression
(D D D D si si dsi dsi it t it t -- - = )( )
ab e DI DI it t it gsp gsp +- + () . DD (2)
This regression captures the extent to which
disposable income responds less to fluctuations
in GSPthan does income. The lower response of
disposableincometofluctuationsinGSPgrowth
is a consequence of the smoothing effect of fed-
eral taxes and transfers.
The regression is best understood by returning
to the example given earlier. Consider a one-
percentage-point increase in DD gsp gsp it t - and
suppose that 40 percent of state-specific fluctua-
tions in GSP growth are smoothed on capital
markets, so that DD si si it t - increases 0.6 per-
centage point. If federal taxes and transfers
smooth an average of an additional 10 percent of
state-specific fluctuations in GSP growth, the
total smoothing of disposable income provided
by capital markets and federal taxes and trans-
fers is 50 percent. As a result, state-specific
growth in disposable income, DD dsi dsi it t - ,
increases 0.5 percentage point. Then the differ-
ence between state-specific income and dispos-
ableincomegrowth,thevariableontheleftside
of equation (2), rises 0.1 percentage point.
Therefore, the coefficient bDI is 0.1, corre-
sponding to the fraction of GSP fluctuations
absorbed by disposable income smoothing.
11
Measuring consumption smoothing. An esti-
mate of the amount of consumption smoothing
is obtained from the coefficient bC in the
regression
() ( ) DD D D dsi dsi c c it t it t -- - =
ab e CC i t t i t gsp gsp +- + () . DD (3)
This regression captures the extent to which
consumption responds less to fluctuations in
GSPthandoesdisposableincome.Theestimate
of bC corresponds to the fraction of state-
specific fluctuations of GSP growth that is
absorbed by consumption smoothing. Con-
tinuing the earlier example, if consumption
smoothing absorbs an additional 20 percent of
fluctuations in GSP, the total smoothing of con-
sumption provided by capital markets, federal
taxes and transfers, and saving adjustments is
70 percent. In this case, a one-percentage-point
rise in state-specific GSP growth causes
state-specific consumption growth, DD cc it t - ,
to increase 0.3 percentage point, while
state-specific growth in disposable income,
DD dsi dsi it t - , rises 0.5 percentage point. Then
the variable on the left side of equation (3)
increases 0.2 percentage point, yielding bC=
0.2.
Measuring the overall departure from full
risk sharing. Because income smoothing, dis-
posable income smoothing, and consumption
smoothing may not yield full risk sharing, it is
important to measure the departure from full
risk sharing. The coefficient bU in the follow-
ing regression provides this estimate:
12
() DD cc it t -=
+- + be Ui t t i t gsp gsp () DD (4)
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aUThe coefficientbU measures the average frac-
tion of state-specific fluctuations of GSPgrowth
that is unsmoothed, that is, not absorbed through
anysmoothingmechanism.Ifrisksharingisfull,
state-specific consumption growth equals aggre-
gate consumption growth. In this case, the vari-
able on the left side of equation (4) equals zero,
sobU =0. But if risk sharing is not full, changes
in state-specific output lead to changes in state-
specificconsumption,andbU >0.Intheexample
above, the three risk sharing mechanisms smooth
a total of 70 percent of state-specific GSPfluctua-
tions. As a result, a one-percentage- point rise in
state-specific GSP growth causes state-specific
consumption growth to increase 0.3 percentage
point. Thus,bU =03 . .
By construction, the regressions described
in this section provide a complete decomposi-
tion of state-specific fluctuations in GSP
growth. The fluctuations are divided into the
fractions smoothed by each of the three smooth-
ing mechanisms and the fraction not smoothed.
In particular, the coefficient estimates satisfy
bb bb ID IC U ++ + = 1.
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II. ESTIMATES OF RISK SHARING
PATTERNS
The regressions described in the last section
yield estimates of the patterns of risk sharing.
After describing some of the data used in the
regressions, this section compares the patterns
of risk sharing within large U.S. regions to pat-
terns within the United States as a whole. The
patterns differ along some important dimen-
sions. For example, states in the central United
States achieve less income smoothing through
capital markets and rely relatively more on con-
sumption smoothing, while the opposite is true
for eastern states.
To determine whether risk sharing is impeded
by geographic distance, this section also exam-
ines the patterns of risk sharing across large
regions of the United States. In this analysis, the
basic regression methodology is modified simply
by replacing an individual state with a larger
region,suchastheeast,andtherisksharinggroup
consists of all the U.S. regions. If the coefficients
are lower in the regressions using large regions
that span the entire United States than in the
regressions using states within particular regions,
distanceisabarriertorisksharing.Theregression
resultsshowthatthereisnoconsumptionsmooth-
ing across larger regions, while income smooth-
ing and disposable income smoothing are inde-
pendent of distance.
Data
This section defines state income, disposable
income, and consumption  variables for which
data are not published directly  and the broad
regions used in the analysis. The appendix
describes the data in greater detail.
The variable state income is an estimate of the
total income that the residents and government of
a state would have at their disposal if there were
no federal government (Asdrubali, Sorensen, and
Yosha).
14 Disposable state income is simply
defined as state income minus federal taxes,
plus federal transfers.
15 Because the construc-
tionofthestateincomeseriesfromtheunderly-
ing data sources is difficult, the data set used in
theregressionanalysis,thesameasthatusedby
Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha, has not been
updated past 1990.
16
State consumption is approximated as the
sum of retail sales and state government con-
sumption. Retail sales data provide a proxy for
household spending. State government con-
sumption is defined as government expendi-
tures minus transfer payments.
The four broad regions used in the regression
analysis are aggregates of official regions
defined by the BEA. Figure 1 shows the precise
definitions of the regions, simply referred to as
east, west, south, and central.
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The estimates of risk sharing among all 50 U.S
states are shown in the first column of Table 1.
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A central empirical finding is that, over the
1963-90 period, 39 percent of GSP fluctuations
weresmoothedthroughcapitalmarkets.Thedis-
posable income smoothing provided by federal
taxes and transfers absorbed only 14 percent of
GSP fluctuations, on average. Consumption
smoothing absorbed 25 percent.
18 Finally, 23
percent of fluctuations were not smoothed at all,
implying that full risk sharing was not
achieved.
19
There are some important regional differences
in risk sharing patterns (Table 1). Although risk
sharing within the east group was very similar to
the nationwide pattern, risk sharing within the
central group was clearly different. While
income smoothing absorbed 39 percent of
state-specific GSP fluctuations in the nation-
wide estimates, only 28 percent were absorbed
through this mechanism in the central group.
Surprisingly, consumption smoothing was so
large in the central group that consumption
by states in this region was totally buffered
from GSPfluctuations. In other words, the cen-
tral group achieved full risk sharing as mea-
sured by consumption.
Asystematicsearchforanexplanationofthese
patterns is beyond the scope of this article, but
they might be largely explained by industrial
structure. Agricultural states like those in the
central group typically achieve less income
smoothing, but show a high degree of consump-
tion smoothing, which is fully consistent with







Note: The map defines the aggregate regions used in the regression analysis.these findings (Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha).
Three underlying factors may help explain this
phenomenon. First, during the 1963-90 period,
many farms did not have the opportunity to issue
stocks on organized markets. Second, farmers
tended to have their assets tied up in their own
farm.Thesefactorsprecludedsubstantialamounts
of income smoothing through capital markets.
Third,fluctuationsofagriculturaloutputareoften
less persistent than those of, say, manufacturing
output. A bad harvest due to weather conditions
will typically not repeat itself for years on end, so
it makes sense for farmers to maintain the same
level of consumption in a bad year by saving less
or borrowing more.
The patterns of income and consumption
smoothing in the south and west groups also dif-
fered from nationwide patterns, as well as from
those in the central group. In the south and west
groups, capital markets provided relatively exten-
sive income smoothing. Again, this may be due
to industrial structure. States in the south and
westarerichinnaturalresources.Becausethese
resources are often owned by large corporations,
states with a large amount of resource extrac-
tion displayed considerable income smoothing
(Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha). For exam-
ple, the value of Alaskan oil production and, in
turn, Alaskan GSP varies widely from year to
year because oil prices are highly variable.
However, most of the income from Alaskan oil
extraction goes to large oil companies owned
by stockholders located far from Alaska, while
the wages of Alaskans working in the oil indus-
try vary relatively little with the price of oil,
leading to substantial income smoothing.
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Table 1
ESTIMATES OF THE SOURCES OF RISK SHARING WITHIN REGIONS
Percent of state-specific GSP fluctuations smoothed
Region
U.S. East Central South West
Income smoothing 39 36 28 47 46
(1) (3) (3) (3) (2)
Disposable income smoothing 14 14 10 15 14
(1) (3) (1) (1) (1)
Consumption smoothing 25 17 61 28 21
(4) (3) (7) (7) (6)
Unsmoothed 23 33 2 11 19
(3) (12) (5) (7) (5)
Note:Eachcolumnoffiguresreportsestimatesofthesourcesofrisksharingamongstateswithintheidentifiedgroup.The
entriesofeachcolumnmaynotsumto100becauseofrounding.Eachentryinparenthesesisthestandarderroroftheesti-
mated percentage reported above the standard error. The estimates are based on the period 1963-90.Risk sharing across regions
Just as the patterns of risk sharing within
regions vary, the patterns of risk sharing across
largeU.S.regionsdiffersomewhatfrompatterns
across states. Over the 1963-90 period, essen-
tially no consumption smoothing occurred
across the east, west, south, and central regions
(Table 2). The point estimate indicates that con-
sumption smoothing between regions was nega-
tive, although not statistically different from
zero, and is interpreted as zero.
Theabsenceofconsumptionsmoothingacross
large regions means that regional consumption
closely tracks region-specific fluctuations in dis-
posable income. There are two potential expla-
nations for this finding. One explanation may be
that, because credit markets tend to be regional
in nature, regions do not borrow from each
other. In particular, over the 1963-90 period,
interstate banking was severely limited in the
United States, making borrowing across
regions more difficult. Asecond explanation is
that individuals may base their own spending
ontheobservedspendinghabitsofotherpeople
(Duesenberry). Such behavior could make a
states consumption more similar to the con-
sumptionlevelsofnearbystatesthantothoseof
distant states.
In contrast, income smoothing was virtually
the same across large regions as across states.
These results strongly indicate that U.S. capital
markets transcend geography. For example,
most pension and mutual funds are highly diver-
sified geographically across the United States.
20
Similarly,theamountofincomesmoothingdue
to federal taxes and transfers was virtually the
same across large regions as between the states
within the regions. This is not surprising since the
federal tax code and transfer programs do not
includespecialfeaturesforparticularregionsin
the United States.
With geography having no effect on income
and disposable income smoothing but pre-
venting consumption smoothing across large
regions, in total there appears to be less risk
sharing across broad regions than across states
within regions. This finding means risk sharing
is more effective at mitigating output fluctua-
tions that are specific to states than output fluc-
tuations that affect an entire region of the
United States. Therefore, policymakers should
be more concerned by regionwide variation in
output than by variation in an individual states
output.
III. CONCLUSION
This article has identified three mechanisms
through which risk is shared across regions of
the United States: income smoothing through
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Table 2
ESTIMATES OF THE SOURCES
OF RISK SHARING ACROSS
LARGE REGIONS










Note: The table entries are estimates of the sources
of risk sharing across the east, west, south, and cen-
tral regions. Each entry in parentheses is the stan-
dard error of the estimated percentage reported
above the standard error. The estimates are based on
the period 1963-90.capital markets, disposable income smoothing
through federal taxes and transfers, and consump-
tionsmoothingthroughsavingadjustments.Build-
ing on previous research, the article estimated
empirically how much each of these mecha-
nisms contributes to risk sharing. For the period
1963-90, income smoothing was by far the most
important source of risk sharing.
The article further examined whether risk shar-
ing within four major regions of the United States
exhibits similar patterns, finding clear regional
differences in income and consumption smooth-
ing but small differences in disposable income
smoothing. States within the central United States
rely relatively less on income smoothing than on
consumption smoothing, while the opposite is
true for states in the west and south. These pat-
ternslikelyreflectindustrialstructure,inpartic-
ular regional differences in the dependence on
agriculture versus natural resource extraction.
Finally, the article evaluated whether income
and consumption smoothing are local in nature.
The income smoothing provided by capital
markets was found to be truly nationwide, tran-
scending geographic barriers. Similarly, geo-
graphic distance has no effect on disposable
income smoothing. Consumption smoothing,
on the other hand, is significantly stronger among
neighboring states. In fact, there is no consump-
tionsmoothingacrosslargegeographicregions,
reflecting either the regional nature of credit
markets or geographic patterns in consumption
behavior. Overall, there is less risk sharing across
broadregionsthanacrossstateswithinregions.
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APPENDIX
THE DATA
As detailed in Asdrubali, Sorensen, and
Yosha, the data are drawn from a variety of
sources. Data for GSP, the value added of
allindustrieslocatedinastate,areavailable
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA).
21 Data on state population and per-
sonal income net of social security receipts
(thesumofearningsanddistributedprofits,
including interest and rent) are also available
from the BEA. Income of state governments
hasbeenpiecedtogetherfrommanysources,
most importantly Governmental Finances
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
State income is defined as the sum of per-
sonal income net of transfers, federal
nonpersonal taxes and contributions, inter-
est on state and local government trust
funds, and state and local government
nonpersonaltaxes.Thelogicistoaddupall
sources of income that would be available
for a state, ceteris paribus, if there were no
federal government. There is no official
series that corresponds to this concept. To
construct the income series, earnings and
profits are calculated from the official BEA
data for personal income, which are pre-
personal income tax but post- all other fed-
eral taxes as well as post- social security
contributions and transfers. Therefore, per-
sonal and employer social security contri-
butions are added to the BEA personal
incomefigures,andsocialsecuritytransfers
are subtracted. Federal nonpersonal taxes,
which include corporate taxes and indirect
business taxes imputed to individual states,
are added, as are state nonpersonal taxes.
State governments are considered passive
agents for the residents of a state. There-
fore, in this accounting, taxes collected by
the government of a state are available for
consumption by the individuals in the state,
possibly in the form of state public goods.
22
Finally,the(considerable)interestrevenue
from the states trust funds is added to the
measure of state income.
Disposable state income is defined as
state income plus federal direct transfers to
individuals in a state (for example, social
security), plus federal grants to the govern-
ment of the state, minus total federal taxes
raised in the state (including social security
contributions). Federal grants to states are
published in the Statistical Abstract of the
United States, whereas federal personal
taxes are available by state from the BEA.
State consumption consists of consump-
tion by the residents of the state and con-
sumption by the state government. Annual
retail sales by state is used as a proxy for
private state consumption. Actual private
consumption at the state level is not avail-
able,soretailsalesarere-scaledbytheratio
of total private consumption to total U.S.
retail sales. Retail sales are a somewhat
noisy proxy for state private consumption
but they are the best available. State gov-
ernment consumption is defined as state
expenditures minus state transfers.
The nominal values of GSP, income, dis-
posable income, and consumption are con-
verted to real terms using the consumer
price index (CPI). Because the ultimateENDNOTES
1 Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha were the first to consider
the full set of risk sharing mechanisms in a unified frame-
work. Prior studies (Mace; Cochrane; Townsend; Attanasio
and Davis; Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland; and others) only
considered overall smoothing of consumption.
2 It should be stressed that risk sharing does not mean that
income is redistributed across states. Ultimately, every state
is better off when risk is shared.
3 Using a specific economic model, Kalemli-Ozcan,
Sorensen, and Yosha estimate, for individual U.S. states, the
potential gains from U.S.-wide interstate risk sharing, and
find them to be substantial and similar in magnitude to the
gains from risk sharing among OECD countries.
4 Grants to state governments, in particular Medicaid, also
smooth state-level disposable income. But because direct
federal transfers are much larger than grants to states, the
term transfers will be used as shorthand for transfers and
grants.
5 Typically, systems of taxes and transfers are not primarily
intended to provide risk sharing. The systems main goals
are to finance public goods and to redistribute income, but
these activities will often result in smoothing of disposable
income.
6Theoreticalstudieshaveshownthatfullrisksharingwithin
a group of states implies the per capita consumption of every
state is a fixed fraction of the pooled per capita consumption
of the group. The main assumptions necessary to derive the
result are that utility functions exhibit constant relative risk
aversion and that all states discount future utility at the
same rate. However, these theoretical studies do not distin-
guish income from consumption. As a result, in this article,
the standard definition of full risk sharing is expanded to
applytoincomesmoothinganddisposableincomesmooth-
ing.
7 In terms of the information displayed in Chart 1, this
means that risk sharing can smooth state-specific fluctua-
tions in GSP growth, but not fluctuations in GDP growth
for the entire United States.
8 These characteristics of full risk sharing do not depend in
any manner on the statistical properties of output fluctua-
tions. Hence, no assumptions regarding the statistical prop-
erties of these fluctuations need to be made. In particular,
this article makes no attempt to distinguish predictable and
unpredictable fluctuations in output. Asdrubali, Sorensen,
andYoshafoundnodifferenceinthesmoothingofpredict-
able and unpredictable fluctuations.
9 This type of data set is known as a panel data set.
10Intheactualestimation,theconstantaI isallowedtodif-
fer across states. That is, the regression actually includes
state-specific fixed effects. The same is true of the other
regressions presented later in the article. The empirical
results with and without fixed effects are very similar.
11 If the combination of income smoothing and disposable
income smoothing provides full risk sharing, then
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benefitofrisksharingcomesfromreducing
the volatility of consumption spending, this
article focuses on the value of output and
income in terms of the consumption they
can allow. Accordingly, the CPI is used to
deflate nominal output, income, disposable
income, and consumption. Although the
BEA publishes a GSP deflator for each
state, the deflator is an index of the produc-
tion value, rather than the consumption
value, of output.
States are classified into four major
regions, which are combinations of the
eightofficialregionsoftheBEA(Beemiller
and Dunbar). The regions used are New
England and the Mideast (east), Great
Lakes and Plains (central), Southeast
(south), and Southwest, Rocky Mountain,
and Far West (west). This article uses four
regions rather than the official eight
because more precise estimates are
obtained when the number of states within
each region is larger.state-specific disposable income growth, DD dsi dsi it t - ,i s
zero (because the growth rates of state disposable income
and aggregate disposable income are equal). In that event,bI
andbDI sum to one. To see that this is indeed the case, rear-
range equation (1) to get
DD si si it t -= constant
+- - + () ( ) . 1 be Ii t t i t gsp gsp DD
If DD dsi dsi it t - is zero, regression (2) is the same as this
regression, withbb DI I =- 1.
12 Many risk sharing studies, including nearly all of those
listed in note 1, have used regression equation (4) to test for
full risk sharing.
13 Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha use a decomposition of
the cross-sectional variance of state-level GSP growth to
estimate the b coefficients. Their notation is slightly differ-
ent, since they use the notation bK for (capital market)
income smoothing and bF for (federal) disposable income
smoothing.
14 For a given state, the difference between state income and
GSP is the income originating fromor going toother
states due to income smoothing. However, this measure
overestimates the amount of smoothing achieved through
capital markets because part of the measured smoothing
should be attributed to corporate earnings retention patterns
(it is well known that corporations tend to smooth dividend
payments), but there are no data that would allow an alloca-
tion of corporate savings by state. The measure of income
smoothing is also affected by capital depreciation, for which
state-level data are also unavailable. Sorensen and Yosha
compare interstate risk sharing in the United States to inter-
national risk sharing among OECD countries (for which
both corporate earnings retention and capital depreciation
data are available), and argue that most of the estimated
income smoothing for U.S. states is indeed due to interstate
ownership of assets.
15Asindicatedinnote4,thetermtransfersisusedtoinclude
grants to state governments. Accordingly, measured state
income includes the value of both direct transfers and
grants.
16Endingthesamplein1990alsofacilitatescomparisonto
the results in previous studies.
17 Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha report nearly identical
results, even though that study used a slightly different
methodology. Instead of controlling directly for aggregate
variables by using state-specific growth rates, Asdrubali,
Sorensen, and Yosha removed groupwide fluctuations
using time-specific dummy variables.
18 Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha performed similar
regressions using 3-year intervals, rather than annual data.
They found that income smoothing and disposable income
smoothing vary little with the time interval. In contrast,
there is nearly no consumption smoothing over 3-year
intervals, underscoring the fact that consumption smooth-
ing is only effective at mitigating short-term fluctuations.
19 Nonetheless, in the United States as a whole, 77 percent
of state-specific GSP fluctuations were smoothed on aver-
age.SorensenandYoshashowthatmuchlesssmoothingis
achieved among OECD and European countries. Although
many participants in the debate on European Monetary
Unification (Sala-i-Martin and Sachs; Krugman) have
discussed the need for a system of federal taxes and trans-
fers to smooth country-specific shocks, capital markets are
the most important source of smoothing in the United
States.
20 Coval and Moskowitz provide evidence that some fund
managers invest more heavily in geographically close
firms.
21 Because the GSP data currently published by the BEA
begin in only 1977, the recent GSP data have been spliced
withpreviouslypublishedGSPdatafortheperiod1963-76.
22 State government taxes levied on personal income
should, however, not be added since they are already
counted as personal income.
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